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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL...-	This Information has been Authorized for Release to ...

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DDI 0661/84
ACIS 058/84
27 January 1984
Copy ____ of ____

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: Ambassador Rowny's Visit

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This "fast-track" memorandum presents you with the topics which are likely to be on Ambassador Rowny's mind when he visits you on Monday:

- He will have seen the President that morning (see attached draft press release) and will be interested in your appraisal of the prospects for the resumption of START. (S)

We believe that the recent Soviet signals in response to the President's conciliatory comments on US-Soviet relations suggest that they are seriously interested in resuming the arms control dialogue with the US. The signals have varied from Andropov's requirement for "practical deeds" as a prerequisite to resuming the INF talks to Central Committee official Zagladin's comment that the START talks are likely to resume "well before the year is out" after the Soviet internal study of the strategic situation and their "counterdeployments" are completed. It seems to us that the Soviets are groping for a face-saving formula to permit them to return. At the same time, they seem to be testing the water in the US to see if the Administration is prepared to make any concessions to get the talks going again in an election year. (S)

- He has been using the START delegation to game possible Soviet approaches if and when the talks resume--particularly START-INF merger issues. (S)

We believe that if the START talks resume before the INF talks do, the Soviets will attempt to introduce the INF issues into START. They, of course, can do this without a preliminary commitment from the US but will probably try to get such a commitment, as a form of concession, before resuming. If this

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occurs, the Administration would probably come under heavy pressure from NATO to agree and resume what would then, in effect, be a merged START-INF negotiation. (S)

-- He may suggest that we be prepared to take greater risks with sources and methods in the negotiations.

The Ambassador's staff apparently believes that the delegation could be more effective in discussions with the Soviets if sources and methods considerations were not so inhibiting. For example, some on the delegation want to open a discussion with the Soviets on

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Attachment:
As stated

PRESS RELEASE
FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR ROWNY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN
MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 1984, 0945

Two weeks ago today, President Reagan spoke to the nation concerning US-Soviet relations and his hope for improved dialogue. Last week, in his State of the Union address, he extended the olive branch to the Soviet people. In this vein, he and I have just met to review what has happened up to now in the strategic arms reduction talks and discussed what the future may hold. We discussed five key points:

First, the US has a good proposal on the table in START which, if the Soviets would accept it, would amount to real arms control. It calls for deep reductions in ballistic missile warheads on both sides to equal levels and would lower the level of nuclear confrontation. It would increase stability in the superpower relationship and lower the risk of nuclear war.

Second, we have responded to problems the Soviets had with our original proposal. They said it was too restrictive, too complicated, and by proposing to negotiate in two phases we were failing to place everything on the table. We made modifications to our proposal to alleviate their problems and collapsed the two phases into one. We thus made progress toward an agreement.

Third, I carried out the President's decision of last October to incorporate into our proposal the build-down concept. This concept calls for guaranteed annual reductions in a manner which would contribute to stability. This concept was originally designed by several senators and representatives and has strong bipartisan support in the Congress. We believe this concept has great merit and will continue to seek Soviet agreement to it.

Fourth, the Soviets in the most recent round of START agreed to our proposal to discuss confidence-building measures designed to reduce tensions and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Discussion of these measures bodes well for the future.

And finally, we have told the Soviet Union we are prepared to explore possible trade-offs of US interests and concerns for Soviet interests and concerns in the spirit of meeting the Soviets half-way in an effort to move the negotiations forward. Specifically, we believe our advantage in cruise missile programs can be balanced against their advantage in ballistic missile deployments. Such concrete trade-offs would answer both President Reagan's and General Secretary Andropov's challenges that we concern ourselves with deeds and not words.

At the end of the last round, my Soviet counterpart did not agree with my proposal to resume the START talks in early February, saying that the Soviets needed time to reassess the situation. The best way to continue to make progress toward our goal of an agreement is for the Soviet Union to return soon to the negotiating table in Geneva. The United States stands ready to resume the START negotiations at any time. Unless we return to the table we cannot make progress toward an agreement which substantially reduces the nuclear arsenals of both nations. Such an agreement would reduce the risk of nuclear war and therefore is in our interest, in the Soviets' interest, and in the interest of the people of the entire world.

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